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NOW THE CODE RUNS ITSELF  
On-chain and Off-chain Governance of Blockchain Technologies 
 
Introduction  
 The invention of Bitcoin in 2008 as a new type of electronic cash has arguably 
brought about one of the most radical financial innovations in the last decade. In the 
past few years, not only has Bitcoin gained tremendous public attention, but its central 
architectural backbone—the blockchain—has also spread its wings into a multitude of 
new fields. Blockchain technologies create a ‘trustless’ proof mechanism for 
transactions between users, and allow for the registration of assets and the self-
execution of software code (also known as ‘smart contracts’)1. In particular, the topic 
of blockchain governance has become central in the blockchain community, notably 
in the aftermath of the attack on ‘The DAO’—a decentralized venture capital fund 
that was meant to be the world’s first fully functioning decentralized autonomous 
organization (DuPont 2017). We will use The DAO attack as an illustrative case study 
of some of the key issues that arise in blockchain governance. 
The governance of blockchain-based systems usually incorporates a variety of 
rules and procedures that may be implemented both ‘on-chain’ and ‘off-chain’. On-
chain governance refers to rules and decision-making processes that have been 
encoded directly into the underlying infrastructure of a blockchain-based system. This 
type of governance defines the rules of interactions between participants through the 
infrastructure within which these interactions take place; these interactions are solely 
determined by rules embedded within the underlying blockchain code—the so-called 
rule of code (De Filippi & Wright 2018). The rules and processes may be layered; 
meaning that one layer of rules is subject to another. For instance, some rules may 
allow for infrastructural changes by stipulating the procedures to change other (lower-
level) rules, and potentially even the (higher-level) rules themselves. On-chain 
governance cannot be easily avoided or bypassed stricto sensu, because it operates 
                                                
1 Since there is a wide literature about the basics of blockchain technology (cf. Grinberg 2012; 
Tschorsch and Scheuermann 2016), we will not engage in a technical exposition of how it works. 
Instead, we will focus on the governance structures adopted by blockchain systems and communities 
and how these are susceptible to transform social and legal relations between people. 





according to a system of rules that have been encoded directly into the system that is 
responsible for enforcing them. Off-chain governance comprises all other (i.e. non-
on-chain) rules and decision-making processes that might affect the operations and 
the future development of blockchain-based systems. Off-chain governance includes 
both endogenous and exogenous rules. The former category refers to the rules adopted 
by a reference community to ensure the proper functioning and ongoing development 
of a blockchain-based system (including procedures to implement protocol changes). 
The latter category includes all rules imposed by a third-party onto the reference 
community, e.g. national laws and regulations, contractual agreements, technology 
standards, and so forth2.  
The ongoing debate about on-chain and off-chain governance turns on the 
practical question of whether existing rules and decision-making processes governing 
a blockchain-based system should be changed from the inside or the outside by the 
reference community, and whether the system should provide for a mechanism to 
change the governance structure itself. This practical question leads to the more 
theoretical and normative question of whether an existing set of code-based rules 
could and should overtake the exercise of human judgment in decision-making, and 
what are the ethical and political considerations this would entail (De Filippi & 
Hassan 2018). Addressing these questions brings about a new legal discourse. In an 
earlier paper on blockchain technology, Reyes argues that distributed ledger 
technology (DLT), such as blockchain technology, “will change legal discourse about 
the fundamental elements of legal systems, including substantive law, legal structures, 
and legal culture” (Reyes 2017, p. 1). The new legal discourse, she claims, “will stand 
on its own as a new field of legal academic inquiry and area of legal practice” (ibid, p. 
63). While this observation seems correct, blockchain technology also brings to the 
fore ideas that have long been subject to jurisprudential debate. 
This paper seeks to situate the blockchain discussion within the field of legal 
philosophy, examining how legal theory can apply in the context of blockchain 
governance. In doing so, it furthermore aims to connect analyses of the governance of 
financial technologies with the broader academic debate on philosophy of money and 
                                                
2 Because of these specificities, most blockchain-based systems rely on off-chain governance only in 
exceptional situations when on-chain governance fails or is unable to process a certain decision—for 
example, when a protocol change is required to improve a network’s functionalities or fix technical 
issues that would otherwise place the whole network in jeopardy. 





finance (cf. Ippoliti & Chen, 2017; Mackenzie, 2006)3. In particular, the paper 
explores Carl Schmitt’s criticism of a positivist legal order, which he developed in 
contrast to the account of positivism espoused by Hans Kelsen, and how this criticism 
is related to the ongoing debates on blockchain governance. Our analysis includes 
three steps. First, we examine whether a critique of on-chain governance might 
parallel Schmitt’s critique of Kelsen’s legal positivism. Second, we consider to what 
extent The DAO attack and its aftermath constituted a state of exception that 
challenged the legal order of Ethereum’s internal (on-chain) governance structure. 
Third, we reflect on Schmitt’s argument that the coalescence of private interests is a 
vulnerability of positivist legal systems, and accordingly posit this as an inherent 
vulnerability of on-chain governance of existing blockchain-based systems.  
On-Chain Governance: “Now the Code Runs Itself” 
First, we ask whether a critique of on-chain governance might parallel 
Schmitt’s critique of Kelsen’s conception of a positivist legal order. This critique 
hinges on the question of whether a legal order can be self-sustaining or whether it 
depends on decision-making by a sovereign authority (Dyzenhaus 1994, p. 10). Off-
chain governance and on-chain governance fundamentally differ along similar lines: 
off-chain governance allows for interventions into the blockchain protocol that are not 
prescribed by the protocol itself, by outside authorities. In other words, with off-chain 
governance people are in charge of the code, without their actions being determined 
by it. However, off-chain governance introduces the problem of personal sovereignty 
(e.g. strong individuals dominating decision-making processes). At first blush, 
therefore, on-chain governance seems to be the preferable mode of governance for 
blockchain-based systems because it ensures that no individual or group of 
individuals can impose their will on the blockchain community at large. Such a mode 
of governance seems to embrace a number of central premises of legal positivism, 
notably of the type of positivism espoused by Kelsen.   
                                                
3 As Ippoliti and Chen argue, a central aspect of debates in philosophy of finance, notably with regard 
to the “view from the inside” (i.e. the study of internal mechanisms of the financial system), is the 
qualitative study - involving the use of philosophical methods - of “trades executions, laws, 
institutions, regulators, the behavior and the psychology of traders and investors” (Ippoliti & Chen, 
2017, p. viii). This paper contributes to studies of this kind because it uses a philosophical method to 
analyze the governance system of blockchain technologies, which at least in the first instance have 
been developed as explicitly financial technologies (i.e. digital currencies).     





According to Kelsen, a positivist legal order enables a peaceful and legitimate 
resolution of disputes in a pluralist society, without recourse to external sources 
(moral or political) to justify its legitimacy. Kelsen believed that laws are valid if 
promulgated in accordance with the ‘basic norm’ of the legal order and with the 
legislative procedure that is authorized by this basic norm (Vinx 2007, pp. 23, 40). He 
thereby emphasized the content-independence of the law’s legitimacy (Hart 1994, p. 
36). As Vinx explains, Kelsen denied “a necessary relation between legitimacy and 
justice because he wanted to attack the idea that positive law is legitimate (…) only as 
long as its content conforms to some absolute standard of justice external to positive 
law” (Vinx 2007, p. 23).  
Due to its reliance on rational, factual tests to settle disputes, Kelsen’s 
conception of law making and enforcement aims to exclude any notion of private 
human judgment. This is most evident in Kelsen’s conception of a pure legal rule. 
Voegelin, who was a doctoral student of Kelsen, condenses Kelsen’s “pure legal rule” 
to a conditional algorithm: "If Mh + E (or Mu + E), then Z => M" from which all 
codes and statutes derive (Voegelin 1927, pp. 270-271). The first part of the algorithm 
denotes past occurrences of behaviors, either in terms of performance (Mh) or 
avoidance (Mu), in conjunction with events (E) that usually occur as a result of said 
behavior, and the second part denotes the direction of enforcement by an official 
authority (Z) against the individual engaging in said human behavior (M). For 
instance, if a particular behavior in conjunction with an event constitutes the operative 
fact of “theft”, then the official authorities are to direct their coercive powers to this 
operative fact. If the operative facts such as theft are defined explicitly and precisely, 
the room for individual judgment is narrow. Here, Voegelin argues, the emphasis of 
the pure legal rule rests on enforcement, whereby behavior and events only act as 
conditions for action by official authorities.  Thus, it does not matter who makes the 
laws (or who is the sovereign) as long as the mechanical process of law making and 
enforcement is operating properly.  
Dyzenhaus argues that according to Kelsen’s legal theory “the underlying 
concept is that no individual should be subject to the will of any other individual or 
group of individuals” (Dyzenhaus 1994, p. 10). In order to make this possible, the 
extent to which personal judgment is involved in the making and enforcing of a legal 
order should be reduced to a minimum. Hence, for Kelsen, at the base of a legal 
system does not lay a sovereign power but a ‘basic norm’. To arrive at this concept, 





Kelsen posits the axiom that a description of what is the case (e.g. facts of nature) 
cannot account for what ought to be the case (i.e. a norm). For instance, the validity of 
the norm that one ought not to steal cannot be explained from the description of 
behavior that would constitute stealing. Accordingly, Kelsen argues, “the reason for 
the validity of a norm can only be the validity of another norm” (Kelsen 2005, p. 
194). Kelsen refers to the norm underlying a legal system, from which all other norms 
are derived, as the ‘basic norm’. Notably, this basic norm is not posited as a rule 
within the system, but as a basic presupposition that supports the system from the 
outside. For instance, the statement that laws should be obeyed because they are 
issued by the sovereign would, according to Kelsen, need to admit the fundamental 
notion that obeying the sovereign is the presupposed basic norm (Kelsen 2005, p. 
194). Consequently, the key condition for a functional legal system is that its laws are 
non-contradictory—not that a legitimate sovereign authorizes and enforces them 
(Dyzenhaus 1994, p. 11).  
We can trace the logic of on-chain governance along similar lines as those 
prescribed by Kelsen. A striking commonality between Kelsen’s legal theory and the 
way in which blockchain technologies function is that the validity of transactions in a 
blockchain-based system is not determined by the content of these transactions, but by 
their conformity with the consensus protocol, which is determined by a factual and 
objective mathematical process of verification. For instance, valid blocks with 
transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain are not added based on their contents (i.e. 
based on what is transacted, from whom to whom), but based on the operative fact of 
whether they comply with an algorithmic test performed by a mining node. All 
participants in the system must recognize this type of validity for the system to be 
deemed authoritative. Therefore, it is presumed that the consensus protocol of a 
blockchain-based system represents a shared concept of authority amongst 
participants. As such, Kelsen’s argument that “by presupposing the basic norm (…) 
one ought to behave as the constitution prescribes” (Kelsen 2005, p. 202), can be 
reinterpreted in relation to on-chain blockchain governance: by presupposing the 
basic norm, one ought to behave as the consensus protocol prescribes. This basic 
norm is tacitly presupposed, meaning that the blockchain-based system does not itself 
contain a rule that prescribes it. All other decision-making rules and processes 
implemented in on-chain governance are derived from this basic norm and ought not 
to contradict it.     





Hence, we can observe a striking similarity between the notion of on-chain 
governance and Kelsen’s notion of a positivist legal order. Under this view, not only 
are the rules of interaction between participants dictated by the blockchain protocol, 
but so are the rules defining the operation of the infrastructure within which these 
interactions take place. Some blockchain-based systems realize this form of positivist 
on-chain governance by relying on code-based structures not only for the regulation 
of participants’ behavior, but also for the introduction of changes to the infrastructure 
within which participants operate. For instance, in the Tezos blockchain, the “seed 
protocol specifies a procedure for stakeholders to approve amendments to the 
protocol, including amendments to the amendment procedure itself” (Goodman 2014, 
p. 1). Notwithstanding the ability of individual stakeholders to change the protocol 
rules, once they join the system, they agree to be bound by the current rules of the 
protocol, which ultimately dictates their behavior.4 The first rules contained in Tezos’ 
seed protocol are meant to be highly conservative within that particular blockchain 
ecosystem—displacing the authority of any personalist sovereign that might want to 
intervene. Hence, on-chain governance realized on a blockchain-based system such as 
Tezos shows strong similarities with Kelsen’s positivist conception of the legal order.  
However, as is the case with on-chain governance, Kelsen’s legal theory has 
not remained unchallenged. Schmitt criticizes Kelsen’s conception of the legal order, 
which, according to him, embodies the apotheosis of the enlightenment project 
(Dyzenhaus 1994, p. 10). In appropriating Schmitt’s criticism, we notably do not 
intend to accept it5, but to position it as an important challenge to positivist legal 
systems. Reflecting on the type of legal positivism that Kelsen’s theory represents, 
Schmitt states: 
 
“The general validity of a legal prescription has become identified with the 
lawfulness of nature, which applies without exception. The sovereign, who in the 
deistic view of the world, even if conceived as residing outside the world, had 
                                                
4 This also accords with the way Lessig imagined the code as law, meaning that the limitations placed 
by code (as opposed to simply the limitation of code) intrinsically bind the behavior of participants 
(Lessig 2006). As he argued in an early paper on constitution-making in cyberspace, "while regulation 
in real space is primarily regulation that relies upon the cooperation of the individuals who live under 
the regulation, regulation in cyberspace can be something different. The code in cyberspace - the 
software - can enforce its control directly" (Lessig 1996, p. 899). 
5 In line with Dyzenhaus (1994, p. 19), we explicitly distance ourselves from accepting Schmitt’s 
critique – taking heed of Schmitt’s highly problematic embrace of Nazism – but instead use it as a 
productive critique with which positivist attempts to construct a legal order should be concerned.   





remained the engineer of the great machine, has been radically pushed aside. The 
machine now runs by itself” (Schmitt 2005, p. 48).  
 
To problematize the positivist understanding of the legal order, Schmitt claims 
that the applicability of legal norms presupposes a situation of social normality, 
because legal norms cannot be applied to systems in a chaotic state. Emergencies that 
result from chaos—such as military coups, acts of war, natural disasters, financial 
crises, etc. —could change the situation into abnormality. In conventional public 
governance, far-reaching decisions need to be taken to deal with these emergencies.  
Underlying Schmitt’s central points of criticism is the contention that a 
positivist order—the machine that runs itself—is inherently contradictory as it seeks 
to replace the role of the sovereign (who can make decisions on fundamental issues) 
with an impersonal system of rules (e.g. a majoritarian parliamentary democracy) 
where decisions may be perennially postponed through discussion (Dyzenhaus 1994, 
pp. 4-5; Schmitt 2005, p. 63). Such a system is impersonal, according to Schmitt, 
because human decision-making would be subject to an order of rules that excludes 
private human judgment. However, for a legal order to make sense, Schmitt purports 
that a situation of social normality must exist and that the sovereign is the one who 
decides on what constitutes this normal situation (Schmitt 2005, p. 13). His argument 
rests on his conception of the sovereign as the agent who decides on the exception 
(Schmitt 2005, p. 5)—the very concept that Kelsen sought to dissolve into the legal 
order (Dyzenhaus 1994, p.10). This conception of the sovereign is most clearly visible 
in emergency situations in which exceptional decisions are required and any attempt 
at banishing personal sovereignty is therefore undermined. According to Schmitt, 
decision-making in such instances does not and cannot be premised on existing legal 
norms, but instead derives from “principally unlimited authority” (Schmitt 2005, p. 
12) that manifests itself when the laws that restrict the sovereign’s actions are 
suspended.  
The legal discourse on the state of exception focuses on the conflict between 
the integrity of the legal order and the effectiveness of a government in a state of 
emergency. First, a government needs to recognize an emergency that requires a 
suspension of the legal order. Such an emergency might require the original existing 
order to be changed, thereby activating the state of exception. Second, a government 
faces the decision of revealing that certain bodies or individuals have untrammelled 





authority in contravention of the original order, for example by establishing a court of 
martial law to preside over civilians, the authority of which is not derived from the 
original order. Third, a government can decide to resolve the state of exception and 
stipulate the new order that will ensue from it. Many constitutions of contemporary 
liberal democracies define a state of exception that, to some extent, suspends the 
original legal order. Such a state of exception has for instance been in operation 
during France’s “permanent” state of emergency (Perolini 2017) that was initiated 
after the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. States of emergency are not only declared 
following political events, but also in the case of economic crises such as the financial 
crises in Detroit6 and Puerto Rico.7 Instead of being dealt with from within the 
existing legal order, these emergencies entail the delegation of broad, sovereign 
powers to an executive or designated body to make decisions in the state of exception.  
To be sure, rules governing the creation and dissolution of the state of 
exception might be codified in positive law. Such laws could prescribe what agencies 
will gain decision-making authority, in what way power of different agencies is to be 
balanced, and what timespan might apply to the state of emergency. Schmitt’s 
criticism therefore does not amount to the claim that the state of emergency 
necessarily leads to an undoing of the original positivist legal order. For instance, two 
years after the state of emergency was announced in France it was dissolved, which 
means that the original legal order was (partially8) restored. However, Schmitt’s 
central point is that the laws in operation during the time of the state of emergency 
operate outside of the original legal order (Dyzenhaus 2006, p. 345). In opposition to 
Kelsen, Schmitt argues that conflict in the state of emergency is resolved through 
“some personal act of will emanating from outside the law” (Dyzenhaus 1994, p. 11) 
and that the decision concerning the establishment of an emergency is a personal one. 
Hence, personal judgment is involved in the state of emergency, which leads to the 
risk of the original positivist legal order being transformed into a new one. An 
                                                
6 Public Act No. 436 (2013) in Michigan is a recent example of a legislative response to a state of 
emergency being declared due to financial crises in Detroit and thereby granting an emergency 
manager extensive powers in achieving a financial rehabilitation plan, including the right to make 
binding orders on elected officials. 
7 The Puerto Rico Emergency Moratorium and Financial Rehabilitation Act (2016) is another example 
of such a response to impending debt default. For a historical account, Agamben (2005, pp. 10-22) 
traces the parallels between military and economic emergencies throughout the 20th century.  
8 President Macron’s decision to replace the state of emergency with a new counterterrorist law has led 
some commentators to argue that in fact a permanent state of emergency has been put into effect 
(McQueen 2017).   





important historical case in this regard is the use of article 48 on the state of exception 
in the constitution of the Weimar Republic by its president to dissolve parliament and 
effectively initiate the transition from a parliamentary democracy to a totalitarian state 
(Agamben 2005, p. 15).   
Thus, Schmitt criticizes Kelsen’s legal positivism through the notion of the 
state of exception. As such, Schmitt’s characterization of Kelsen’s vision of a legal 
order as a machine that runs itself can be translated into a formulation of on-chain 
governance: now the code runs itself. Given the similarities that we observed between 
Kelsen’s theory and on-chain governance, we accordingly ask whether a criticism 
similar to the one Schmitt put forward could apply to the practical operation of 
blockchain-based systems. In what follows, we first examine a particular event, the 
DAO attack, which elucidates some of the practical challenges of on-chain 
governance. This examination will lead us to an interpretation of the DAO attack as a 
state of exception in the context of on-chain governance.  
The DAO Attack 
 Some of the landmark experiments with blockchain-based governance are the 
so-called “decentralized autonomous organizations” (“DAOs”). In a nutshell, a DAO 
is a code-based system with internal capital that lives on the blockchain and operates 
autonomously, yet relies on individuals to perform certain tasks that the code cannot 
do. As such, it can be regarded as an algorithmically governed organization that 
responds both to automated code-based rules and deliberate human input (DuPont 
2017, p. 159). The idea is to have automation at the center and humans at the edges 
(Buterin 2014). One of the first real-world implementations of this concept was 
created in April 2016, after the company Slock.it developed a decentralized 
investment fund (called ‘The DAO’), which was deployed on the Ethereum 
blockchain. People that invested money into the fund could directly participate into 
the governance thereof by selecting the projects that they would like the fund to invest 
in. The DAO was operated through a set of code-based rules (“smart contracts”) to 
automatically execute payments when certain conditions are met (Norta 2015, p. 1). 
The DAO had its own forum (“DAOhub”), where most of the deliberations took place 
and a few prominent figures from the Ethereum community agreed to act as 
“curators” for the platform.   





The DAO attracted considerable attention from its earliest stages. When it 
initiated its first round of crowd funding, it raised in 28 days the equivalent of 
US$150 million worth of ether (the cryptocurrency native to the Ethereum 
blockchain) from thousands of investors. As one of the largest crowdfunding 
campaign to date, the popularity of The DAO led the demand for ether to soar, 
bringing its market capitalization beyond US$1 billion (Ryan 2016). However, the 
backers of The DAO had broader ambitions: their goal was not only to provide a new 
means for decentralizing crowd funding, but also to provide the underlying 
framework upon which future DAOs could be built (DuPont 2017, p. 158). 
Unfortunately, the experiment was short-lived. Several warnings were raised 
of potential security risks, and the curators initiated a call for a moratorium on 
funding proposals (Mark et al. 2016). Yet, shortly after The DAO went live, an 
anonymous attacker started to drain ether out of the fund by exploiting a vulnerability 
in the smart contract governing The DAO, which allowed him/her to repeatedly 
execute withdrawal transactions (Daian 2016; Pfeffer 2016). A total of 3.6 million 
ether - worth approximately US$55 million at the time and amounting to about 30% 
of the total funds raised - were siphoned into another DAO (“The Dark DAO”), 
created by the hacker for the purpose of the attack. The DAO governance, as codified 
within the smart contract, lacked a rule on how to deal with this situation. There was a 
general rule permitting an upgrade of the smart contract code, but it did not provide a 
means to retrieve the stolen funds. The DAO attack revealed shortcomings not only in 
the governance of The DAO, but also in that of the Ethereum community as a whole. 
It exposed the limitation of on-chain governance that challenged the underlying 
principles of the Ethereum network, and other blockchain networks (DuPont 2017, p. 
157): the factual verification of transactions (based on formal compliance with the 
protocol, as opposed to their content) and the immutability and irrevocability of such 
transactions, once they have been recorded onto the blockchain.  
The DAO attack triggered fiery discussions within the Ethereum community.9 
Different follow-up steps were discussed and supported by different groups. Several 
community members advocated ‘doing nothing’ (echoing the ‘code is law’ adage). 
                                                
9 See the relevant Reddit discussions here: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/TheDao/comments/4oisep/ether_safe_but_dao_cancelled_were_getting_a_re
fund/; https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oiqj7/critical_update_re_dao_vulnerability/ also 
visualized here: https://dao.consider.it/hard-fork-to-revert-stolen-dao-funds?results=true. Accessed 30 
July 2018. 





Some wanted to proceed with the freezing of all ether stored in The DAO and child 
DAOs, while others believed that the only way forward was to perform a hard fork, 
changing the protocol of the Ethereum blockchain in order to move all funds tied to 
The DAO (including those drained by the hacker) to a new smart contract that would 
enable the investors to withdraw their funds. The latter option violated the 
immutability ethos prevalent in most blockchain-based networks, favoring instead a 
distributed consensus approach, whereby changes in the blockchain protocol are 
deemed to be legitimate insofar the community consents to these changes. In the 
meantime, the attacker wrote an open letter stating that, under the ‘code is law’ 
principle, the ether had been legitimately acquired as per the terms of the smart 
contract - referring to the following terms of the DAO: “Nothing in this explanation 
of terms or in any other document or communication may modify or add any 
additional obligations or guarantees beyond those set forth in The DAO’s code (....) 
The DAO’s code controls and sets forth all terms of The DAO Creation.”10 
At the core of these discussions was the question of whether a hard fork was a 
legitimate response to The DAO attack. A hard fork is a change in the blockchain 
protocol that is not backward compatible with the previous protocol—thus creating a 
separate blockchain that people have to voluntarily switch to.11 Hard forks occur 
repeatedly in the Ethereum network in order to fix bugs, improve the scalability of the 
network, or more generally, transition to a superior consensus protocol. Some of these 
hard forks are required in order to implement a technical fix, others are planned as 
part of the long-term roadmap of Ethereum (Gupta 2015; Wood 2015), but all are 
related to a technical issue that needs to be resolved. What made this hard fork 
exceptional was that it was unplanned, in response to a contentious political and 
moral issue, rather than a previously acknowledged technical issue. The 
implementation of this hard fork necessitated a departure from the existing on-chain 
governance structure of the Ethereum blockchain—one where the order is established, 
                                                
10 See https://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG. Cited 30 July 2018. It should be noted that the authenticity of 
this letter is disputed. However, as DuPont (2017, p. 174) notes, it nonetheless reflects the view of 
many in the Ethereum community at the time.   
11 Forking is a commonly accepted, though exceptional, practice in open source software development 
(Robles and González-Barahona 2012). Nyman and Lindman argue that it is a “central freedom” in 
open source licensing (Nyman and Lindman 2013, pp. 7-8).  In blockchain-based systems, soft forks 
involve a temporary split of a blockchain as part of a software protocol upgrade, in which the original 
blockchain accrues blocks validated by non-upgraded and upgraded nodes (i.e. is backwards 
compatible) and the forked blockchain accrues blocks only from upgraded nodes which, following the 
implementation of the soft fork, tries to achieve a majority of hashing power so that the forked chain 
reflects the truest sequence of events (Acheson 2018).  





only and exclusively, by the underlying blockchain protocol. As the protocol did not 
include the possibility of freezing the funds or reversing the contentious transaction to 
restore the original state of affairs, any attempt at achieving these results would go 
against the integrity of the system.   
 Opponents to the hard fork warned of a slippery slope: once it is deemed 
acceptable to modify a protocol for political, as opposed to technical, reasons, it might 
compromise the much-touted immutability and reliability of the Ethereum blockchain 
as a record of truth. Some of the opponents also claimed that such a hard fork was 
ultimately a ‘bailout’ intended to protect the core development team, which was 
heavily invested in The DAO and thus faced potential conflicts of interest. Instead, it 
was contended that The DAO should be allowed to ‘fail’ and that the Ethereum 
Foundation should not engage in the governance of individual projects such as The 
DAO. Arguments used by those in favor of taking action were mostly grounded in 
political considerations: humans should still have the final say based on social 
consensus, the exploit was significant enough to justify action, and, lastly, taking 
action would keep regulators out of the debate. Some conceded that ‘flexible and 
pragmatic’ governance was desirable and that full decentralization, autonomy and 
algorithmic authority could be realized once Ethereum had reached maturity (DuPont 
2017, pp. 168-169).  
These different views were gauged through opinions expressed on online 
forums such as Reddit, private discussions held with large exchanges and miners, as 
well as through the votes cast by ether and DAO token holders. Eventually, the 
Ethereum core development team released new software with an upgrade of the 
protocol: 89% of the miners voted in favor of the hard fork, whereas 11% decided to 
remain on the original blockchain. This resulted in the creation of two separate 
blockchains: ‘Ethereum Classic’ run in accordance with the original protocol, 
alongside the new ‘Ethereum’ blockchain, governed by an upgraded protocol. The 
reverberations of this event were felt for a long time, with the price of ether taking 
close to a year to recover.    
Having outlined the course of events in the wake of the DAO attack, we argue 
that it is similar to the state of exception as conceptualized by Schmitt in several 
ways. First, a situation of social normality was disrupted by the act of a single agent 
who radically altered the distribution of funds within the system, thereby initiating a 
situation similar to, for instance, a financial crisis. This rupture from the anticipated 





course of events caused by The DAO attack is comparable to political emergencies in 
a situation of abnormality. Second, the new situation of abnormality brought about the 
necessity for a decision but could not be resolved by means of existing on-chain 
procedures or accepted off-chain processes (e.g. a soft fork). It therefore necessitated 
recourse to measures that were not covered by the existing legal order, by the existing 
rules and procedures on the blockchain protocol. Third, the state of exception had to 
be declared in order to be put into effect, which happened when a group of Ethereum 
developers in a closed communication channel developed the strategy to get the major 
cryptocurrency exchanges to halt trading activities (Dupont 2017, p. 163). Fourth, the 
state of exception effectively resulted in a new legal order that was implemented 
through the hard fork.  
We should also, however, observe some important differences between the 
DAO Attack and the state of exception as discussed by Schmitt. First, in contrast to 
liberal democracies the Ethereum community had not developed any positive laws or 
on-chain rules and procedures that would regulate a potential state of exception. No 
procedures existed that regulated which agents should have the authority to decide on 
the exception, what delegation of powers should apply, and what time schedule 
should be in effect. Second, the parties involved in the DAO Attack differ 
substantially from those involved in the managing of states of emergencies in modern 
states. Even though one might speak of the validating nodes in a blockchain-based 
system as a ‘parliament of miners’, the system does not provide for any public offices 
such as those of president or judge. Notwithstanding these differences, however, the 
similarities seem to warrant the claim that the state of exception is a challenge to the 
notion of on-chain governance, especially considering potential future developments 
of blockchain-based systems.  
The Coalescence of Private Participants 
Thus far, we have argued that (1) on-chain governance is similar to Kelsen’s 
conception of the positive legal order and (2) the DAO attack shows that the state of 
exception poses a challenge to on-chain governance. However, we have not yet 
elucidated a more general insight for the governance of blockchain-based systems. 
One might argue that the DAO attack and its response, even while having been in a 
sense a state of exception, constituted a one-off event and did not expose any inherent 





vulnerability in on-chain governance. We return to Schmitt’s critique of the positivist 
legal order in order to argue against such a view and to flag the inherent vulnerability 
of on-chain governance to the coalescence of private participants, which became 
evident in the wake of the DAO attack.  
A central point of Schmitt’s critique, springing from his notion of politics, 
concerns the vulnerability of positivist legal systems to the “growth of private 
powers”12 (Dyzenhaus 1994, p. 13). Schmitt argues that Kelsen’s legal positivism 
equates legitimacy (i.e. the justification of a legal order) with formal legality (i.e. with 
validity of legal prescriptions), which does not account for the content of the rules and 
therefore lacks a substantive conception of the common good (Dyzenhaus 1994, p. 
12).13 Schmitt attributes this procedural conception of legitimacy to parliamentary, 
liberal democracy. He contends that the concrete liberal order cannot accept any 
substantive notion of the common good as the basis of its legitimacy, but can instead 
only rely on a procedural conception of how a shared understanding of the common 
good is to be arrived at, for instance through structured debate and voting in 
parliament. In other words, private actors in a liberal democracy cannot appeal to a 
higher notion of the common good, but only to the procedures that define their 
interactions in a decision-making process. Even though a blockchain-based system is 
far from the equivalent of a liberal parliamentary democracy, it shares this particular 
feature in that a conception of the common good of its reference community can 
solely be based on a procedural conception of legitimacy.  
According to Schmitt, this feature of positivist legal systems provides a fertile 
ground for powerful, competing private interests to arise. The inherent contradiction 
in the legal positivist system, according to Schmitt, is that all private participants who 
are subject to a particular legal order also expect that those who decide subject 
themselves to the same legal order. The content of this legal order—which consists 
only of formal legality—is therefore empty and can only result from negotiations 
between private participants. Because the legal system is incapable of distinguishing 
between right and wrong (i.e. incapable of being grounded in a substantive notion of 
the common good), the capacity to do so is delegated to private participants. They can 
                                                
12 The problem of a growth of private powers is not unique to the blockchain ecosystem. The concept 
of a ‘benevolent dictator’ and an oligarchy among co-developers in open-source software development 
projects has been discussed since the 1990’s (Raymond 1998). 
13 As Reijers et al. (2016) argue, the sum of individual “wills” in blockchain-based systems, 
represented by the nodes, do not allow for the conception of a common will, or common good, as it was 
put forward by the social contract theory of Rousseau. 





organize themselves into what Schmitt designates as civil society, which encompasses 
non-state actors such as civil society organizations (CSOs) and corporations. A 
crucial point is that private participants will have to coalesce in order to provide 
substance for the legal order. In liberal democracies, this happens through the use of 
distinctive liberties such as freedoms of enterprise, of association and of assembly that 
mobilize powerful corporate lobby groups, CSOs and trade unions to promote private 
interests. Schmitt insists that this dynamic of coalescence of private participants and 
growth of private power is inherent to parliamentary liberal democracies and 
ultimately poses a risk of subverting the legal order, notably in a state of exception 
when a decision based on a substantive notion of the common good is called for.      
To what extent might on-chain governance of blockchain-based systems be 
susceptible to the vulnerability of coalescence of private participants in a similar way 
as are liberal parliamentary democracies, at least according to Schmitt? Considering 
the aftermath of the DAO attack, it appears that Schmitt’s criticism has some 
currency. First, participants in the Ethereum community initially shared some of the 
commitments of legal positivism by conflating formal legality (i.e., the valid state of a 
blockchain-based system) with legitimacy (i.e., the justification of the authority of the 
system). This prevented the emergence of any grounded conception of the common 
good and reserved the decisions between right and wrong exclusively to individuals 
or particular groups in these communities. The sovereign was thereby replaced by a 
burgeoning civil society (Dyzenhaus 1994, p. 10), comprising private actors such as 
Ethereum users, miners, mining pools, exchanges, the Ethereum foundation, and so 
forth. Individuals and groups in such a system compete with one another and use 
tactics to gain prominence and power.14  
Reflecting on this tendency of growing private powers in the context of the 
theory of the firm, Wright (2017) argues that all proof of work (and proof of stake) 
systems—the mechanisms that make the machine run itself—will ultimately lead to 
corporate consolidation or to plutocracy. This is because public blockchains are not 
governed according to a ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle. Instead, voting rights are 
allocated in proportion to the number of tokens or hashing power that each individual 
                                                
14 Looking at the most prominent blockchain networks— Bitcoin and Ethereum—this pattern indeed 
seems to be present. Both these networks suffer from a concentration of voting, or ‘mining’, power, 
with a few participants who own large portions of the available assets. In the Ethereum community, 
ether holders, Ethereum developers, miners and exchanges all participate in the governance of the 
network in order to promote their own interests, without much clarity as to which party has decisive 
influence (ConsenSys 2016).  





has. A plutocracy implies government or rule by the wealthy, and consequently favors 
private interests over the common good. Several contemporary societies implement 
some form of plutocracy (the United States is arguably an example), but blockchain-
based systems are distinct in that they do not offer a mixed form of decision-making 
(e.g. partially democratic and partially plutocratic) and implement an exclusively 
plutocratic governance structure, at least as long as this structure is limited to the 
workings of on-chain governance.   
As an initial response, one might simply accept this situation and embrace 
plutocracy as an inevitable status quo for these communities. However, as Schmitt 
argues, such a status quo can be radically altered in the case of an unforeseen state of 
exception, which calls for an arbitrary decision to be made and responded to. In such 
a case, one or more private actors might arise as the sovereign by deciding on a 
particular course of action, thereby overriding the interests of other private actors. In 
the case of the DAO attack, the development team, the Ethereum Foundation and the 
super-nodes that were heavily invested in the DAO had a significant influence in the 
discussions regarding the response to the attack. Moreover, personal sovereignty 
within a plutocracy negates the basic principle of blockchain-based systems, 
according to which no individual or group shall be allowed to impose their will on the 
community. As such, we can equate Schmitt’s claim that a positivist legal system 
bears the risk that the liberal principles that support it are contradicted, with the notion 
that an on-chain governance system faces, in turn, the risk that its supporting 
principles are contradicted.  
We claim that such a contradiction is precisely what happened in the wake of 
the DAO attack. Core developers and members of the Ethereum Foundation 
preliminarily discussed options for resolving the attack behind closed doors. Some of 
the most prominent voices of the Ethereum community took the lead in publicly 
presenting possible options, often without accounting for the interests of all 
stakeholders. The Ethereum Foundation set the parameters for polling community 
opinion15 and the core developers issued the specifications for updating the 
participants’ software client—all in the name of the community. While the 
community could vote on what the default option should be, it was the Foundation 
that set the block number by which votes would be tallied. If we unpack the decisions 
                                                
15 Although community votes were tallied within 12 hours of voting being opened, they accounted for 
only 5% of ether holders (Santos 2018, pp. 38-44). 





that were taken when the emergency arose, we can see how a particular group of 
private participants decided to: recognize the factual existence of an emergency; 
reveal the extent of authority they possess in contravention of the existing order [i.e., 
decentralized consensus]; resolve the state of exception within a set time frame, and 
prefigure the order that will exist following the termination of the state of exception.  
In line with Schmitt, we argue that prior to the hard fork, it was already the 
case that core developers and the Ethereum Foundation acted as the sovereign of the 
order created on the Ethereum blockchain. It could be argued that the locus of 
sovereign power and the exercise of sovereign powers are divided. After all, the 
majority of nodes needed to actively upgrade their software client for the hard fork to 
take effect. However, individual participants that upgraded their client, far from 
exercising their sovereign will, were legitimizing the decision that had been made on 
their behalf during the state of exception. This is an illustration, in the blockchain 
space, of Rossiter’s claim that, while most democracies provide an elected 
representative body with the final authority in deciding to initiate a ‘constitutional 
dictatorship’ pursuant to an emergency, it is usually the parties that wield emergency 
powers who decide whether an emergency exists in the first place (Rossiter 1948, p. 
299). We might clarify this point by drawing an analogy with Roman law. When the 
Roman Senate sensed danger to the Roman Republic, it could issue a decree declaring 
a tumultus (e.g. insurrection, foreign war) and call upon everyone, from consuls to 
ordinary citizens, to take measures to protect the Republic (Agamben 2005, p. 42). By 
following through, the citizenry gave democratic backing to a sovereign decision, and 
thereby to the particular entity that made the decision. This political situation 
concentrates power more radically than plutocracy, as it reveals that a particular 
group can act beyond the legal order by exerting its will on the community.  
The communities surrounding a blockchain-based system should not be 
conflated with traditional political communities, or citizens of a particular nation 
state. What currently sets blockchain-based systems apart from nation states is their 
much more radically voluntary character: all participants are free to leave or to 
implement a hard fork in order to establish a new voluntary community. The 
possibility of exiting the original community at little to no cost diminishes the need to 
voice dissatisfaction and resolve problems within the same political community 
(Hirschman 1972, p. 43). In the DAO attack, those rejecting the hard fork have 
effectively “left” the Ethereum community by selecting the Ethereum Classic 





blockchain as the authoritative blockchain. However, community members are free to 
participate in both blockchain-based systems (Ethereum and Ethereum Classic) 
should they see any value in doing so. We may thus discern two communities with 
potentially overlapping membership. Only the community members who decided to 
participate only in the original network and boycott the upgraded network might be 
said to have retained their original ideology.  
However, two issues should be kept in mind. First, dealing with states of 
exception in blockchain-based systems will become an increasingly contentious and 
problematic matter when the stakes of the participants become higher. In the event 
that a hard fork would decimate the wealth of all participants who oppose a particular 
state of emergency, the existing strategy could hardly be conceived of as a voluntary 
response. Second, the state of exception will become more pressing once open 
blockchain architectures become increasingly used in commerce or by governments 
(for instance when these systems become general-purpose technologies or provide 
basic public goods). If and when utopian visions of cloud communities (Orgad & 
Bauböck 2018)—such as those expressed by the Bitnation project (Atzori 2015)—
become a reality and refugee communities engage in self-governance by providing 
themselves with identity services or property right regimes, any violation of the on-
chain governance structure could create crises and conflicts in the realm of off-chain 
governance (e.g., threats between participants, physical violence). Even though the 
second point, in particular, refers to a speculative state of affairs, the pace of 
technological change and its consequential impact urge us to discuss these issues. 
Mechanisms should be put in place to discourage excessive reliance on the exit 
strategy, and to implement instead more meaningfully and cost-effective ways to 
express the community’s diverse voices.  
Concluding Remarks 
This article has shown that the ideal of on-chain governance has striking 
similarities with Kelsen’s positivist notion of the legal order, which presupposes that 
no individual or group of individuals should be allowed to enforce their will on others 
and that individual sovereignty should be minimized in the decision-making process. 
At first blush, blockchain-based systems seem to provide the technological apparatus 
for realizing Kelsen’s vision of a content-independent understanding of law, where 





formal legality is equated with legitimacy and personal sovereignty is dissolved into 
the legal order. However, in doing so, blockchain-based systems become vulnerable 
to the rise of private interests using off-chain mechanisms to usurp the system of on-
chain governance. This risk becomes most apparent during states of exception, such 
as the DAO attack discussed above, when personal authority asserts itself. This case 
indicates that while the ‘rule of code’ may be formalistically followed within a 
particular on-chain order, sovereignty asserts itself through off-chain mechanisms 
during the state of exception. In light of these traits, extant blockchain governance 
regimes need to be carefully reconsidered and aligned with the ideology of their 
relevant communities.  
Future research can consider the steps that blockchain communities may take 
to resolve states of exception, in a manner that is consonant with their respective 
ideologies. Such research could, for instance, aim to examine the role of the Ethereum 
foundation in both proclaiming the state of exception and acting upon it in the event 
of the DAO attack. A promising way to approach the difficulty of institutionalizing 
the state of emergency for blockchain-based systems would be to consider Rossiter’s 
(1948) model of “constitutional dictatorship”, which confronts states of exceptions in 
a manner that preserves, rather than threatens, liberal democracy and civil rights. 
Other avenues of research to consider would be to reflect on Heller’s notion of 
“ethical fundamental principles of law”, as discussed in a recent article by Dyzenhaus 
(2015, p. 353), or the political philosophy of Strauss, which was largely a response to 
Schmitt’s devastating criticism of liberal ideology and which called for the recovery 
of a classical perspective on politics (Howse 1997, p. 92).  
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